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Abstract—The penetration of dc networks for different appli-
cations in power systems is increasing. This paper presents a
novel methodology for security-constrained optimal power flow
(SCOPF) operation of a power system, such as a smart grid or
a supergrid, with an embedded dc network. The methodology
demonstrates that dc networks can be operated to provide sup-
port to ac systems, increasing its security of supply and resilience
in case of outages, while reducing operational costs. Moreover,
the outage management support can be achieved via a preventive
SCOPF – i.e. the combined network stays N-1 secure after outages
without need for further control action – or via a corrective
SCOPF, by using the fast controls of the ac-dc converters to react
to the contingencies. The methodology relies on the construction
of a binary outage matrix and optimizes only the control variables
of the ac and dc networks. It was successfully tested in system
with 12 buses and in the IEEE30 network with 35 buses.
Operational savings of up to 1% and 0.52% were obtained for the
first and second networks, respectively, while network violations
for the N-1 contingency scenarios were completely eliminated in
the first and reduced by 70% in the former.
Index Terms—MTDC networks, supergrids, SCOPF, outage
management, restoration algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the next two decades circa 80% of all the generatedelectricity is expected to be converted from ac to dc for final
utilization mainly due to the increasing presence of electric
motor drives and power electronic converters (nowadays only
30% is converted) [1]. Nowadays, direct current networks are
present in microgrids and smart grids, in electronic power
distribution systems and in supergrids dedicated to integrat-
ing continental renewable resources [2–4]. Therefore, several
studies have proposed tools to achieve optimal power flow
(OPF) in combined ac-dc networks [5–8].
When a dc network is integrated into existing ac networks,
the control flexibility of the ac-dc converters can alter usual
power flow regimes. The power flow algorithms for combined
ac-dc systems can be simultaneous or unified, i.e. the execution
of the ac and dc networks power flow is done in parallel or,
alternatively, they can be sequential, i.e. the power flows are
solved iteratively until convergence is reached. The simulta-
neous approach is used in [5], whereas the iterative approach
is used in [9]. Hitherto, the usual approach to the ac-dc OPF
problem is to add all the dc power flow equations into a regular
ac OPF problem as a set of linear and non-linear equality
constraints, which is acceptable for small dc networks.
The response to emergency situations in power systems
is usually divided into two main categories, the reliability
planning level and the contingency planning level, which differ
based on the time horizon concerned. The first category, the
reliability planning, has a longer planning horizon of usually
circa 5 to 10 years and regards the decisions needed to
guarantee a reliable system operation and expansion taking
fault cases into account [10, 11]. On the other hand, the real-
time response to emergencies, dealt with in this paper, belongs
to the contingency planning level.
Nowadays, the fact that transmission systems are being ex-
panded using both ac and dc technologies introduces complex-
ity and challenges in the power system operation and control,
but can also contribute to the security of the system, enhancing
power supply security [12], mitigating the ac transmission
congestion [13] and helping in the restoration process in case
of outages [14]. In case of contingencies in the power system,
all the system operator (SO) attention is given to restore the
power supply as fast as possible. The actions undertaken to
deal with real-time emergency situations are known as power
system restoration (PSR) problem [15]. The actions when
a power system is faced which a contingency are normally
divided into states, shown in Figure 1 together with and which
approach can be used for each state.
The main power system states are: Normal, Pre-outage and
Outage [10, 16], In extremis [17] and Restorative [15, 18].
Some studies exist for analysing one or some of the before
described states in hybrid ac-dc systems (for instance, [19],
which takes into account corrective actions, or [20], which
considers preventive actions). The present work deals with
the security constrained operation of a combined ac-dc power
system during the states 1 to 4. One of the challenges identified
in SCOPF analysis is reducing the size of the optimization
problem derived [21, 22]. In general, depending on how
constrained the OPF problem search space is, it is better to
have less constraints as well as less variables to optimize [23].
However, the usual approach increases not only the number of
constraints, but also the number of variables the OPF problem
must optimize, and it may not be acceptable in case larger
Fig. 1. The five possible power system states according to [17].
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dc networks are embedded in the ac networks. Therefore,
this paper presents a novel methodology which reduces the
number of constraints as well as the number of variables the
combined ac-dc OPF problem must consider during emergency
situations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II explains the
proposed methodology. Section IV presents the results for
the normal OPF, and preventive and corrective security-
constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) operation of a 9-bus
ac system with a 3-node dc network (here addressed as the
9AC+3DC network), and for the IEEE 30-bus ac system with
a 5-node dc network (here addressed as 30AC+5DC network).
Finally, conclusions are given and the future work is presented.
II. METHODOLOGY
In the proposed methodology, depicted in Fig. 2, only
control variables are optimized. The methodology works as
follows: for a given initial control vector, the dc state variables
are solved first via a dc power-flow routine.
Afterwards, the ac state variables are solved via an ac
power-flow routine. As they converge separately, there is no
need for iterations between the two power-flow routines since
the outputs of the dc power flow (described in [24–26]) are
used as inputs in the ac power flow. Both the ac and dc power
flows are solved using Newton-Raphson. The only iteration in
the proposed methodology lies in the SCOPF algorithm which
relies on an optimization routine.
The state-variables in dc networks are the direct voltages
of the power electronic converters in power regulation mode,
which means their direct voltages are not known beforehand.
On the other hand, the control variables udc in dc networks are
the active power of the converters in power regulation mode
and the direct voltage of the converters in voltage regulation
mode, i.e. the converters controlling the dc network voltage.
In the ac network, the state variables are the voltage
amplitudes and load angles at the grid PQ nodes, together with
the load angles at the PV nodes. Finally, in the ac network side,
the control variables uac are the voltages and reactive power
of ac generators or ac-dc converters, and the active power of






Pg;1 Qg;1 Vg;1 Pc;1 Qc;1 Vc;1 Uc;1
 (1)
Fig. 2. Proposed OPF methodology for combined ac-dc networks.
where, gn is the number of ac generators in the network and
cn is the numbers of ac-dc converters in the networks. The
dimension of the control vector u is equal:
[u] = 2gn + 2cn   1 (2)
since the active power of the slack ac generator cannot be
optimized.
The objective function, f , for the SCOPF algorithm is taken
as the unit commitment, i.e. minimize the total generation





agi  P 2gi;1 + bgi  Pgi;1 + cgi
!
(3)
where, gn is the number of ac generators in the network.
Other objective functions, e.g. maximize the total social
welfare in a pool market or minimize the overall system losses,
or even a multi-objective optimization are also possible.
When a solution is found, the two power-flow routines are
performed one last time to obtain the state variables for the
final control variables.
The SCOPF algorithm is the core of the optimization
process. It updates the control variables until convergence is
reached and a solution is found. During the optimization step,
the SCOPF algorithm tries to make sure the resulting solution
of the combined ac-dc network is N-1 secure.
A. SCOPF algorithm
The proposed methodology to operate combined ac-dc net-
works can be performed in three different modes: firstly, as a
regular OPF where N-1 security is not considered; secondly, as
a preventive SCOPF where all the necessary measurements to
possible component outages are taken preventively to make the
systems N-1 secure and; thirdly, as a corrective SCOPF where
the power electronic converters change their operational set-
point following an outage so that the network is N-1 secure.
In this work, four main component outages were considered:
ac lines, dc lines, ac generators and ac-dc converters. For each
system state during an outage of one system component – N
states in total – the functioning status of a system component
is represented through a binary variable, x 2 f0;1g, where
the component status is 1 if it is in operation and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, x is a binary outage matrix written as:
xE(N+1) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
xac1;1    xac1;N+1
        
xacn;1    xacn;N+1
xdc1;1    xdc1;N+1
        
xdcn;1    xdcn;N+1
xg1;1    xg1;N+1
        
xgn;1    xgn;N+1
xc1;1    xc1;N+1
        
xcn;1    xcn;N+1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(4)
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where, xaci;j is the status of ac line i during system outage
scenario j and acn is the total number of ac lines in the
network; xdci;j is the status of dc line i during system outage
scenario j and dcn is the total number of dc lines in the
network; xgi;j is the status of generator i during system outage
scenario j and gn is the total number of generators in the
network and; xci;j is the status of converter i during system
outage scenario j and cn is the total number of ac-dc converters
in the network.
The x matrix, which is composed of binary values, deter-
mines which component of the network is out of order during
the contingency scenarios. The value of a component (con-
nected or disconnected) is then used during the solution of the
the power-flow equations. This is the reason why the resulting
dimension of x is E  (N + 1), where E is the number of
network elements included in the N-1 contingency analysis, as
well as the number of possible single contingency scenarios.
In the case where all system components are included in the
N-1 security analysis, then E = N . The last column in (4)
accounts for the situation in which all system components are
operating normally, without outages, as this is the scenario
used for optimizing the system operation cost function.
B. Normal OPF
In case no security constraints are enforced and just a
regular OPF is performed, then the number of outages to
consider is zero and, therefore, the x matrix shown in (4)
becomes xE1 = 1 (a vector of ones). In this scenario the
control variables shown in (1) are optimized so that the total
generation cost given in (3) are minimum.
C. Preventive SCOPF
When a preventive SCOPF is performed the set of control
variables u are the same as for when a normal OPF is done.
However, this set of control variables is employed in N+1
power-flow calculations to make sure that when a system
component has an outage, the network limits are still enforced.
In that case, since there will be N+1 power-flow results, the













where Pgi;N+1 is the active power of the ac generator i when
all the network components are functional and; j is the total
number of system constraint violations when outage j takes
place.
D. Corrective SCOPF
For the corrective SCOPF formulation, the same x – shown
in (4) – is used as for the preventive SCOPF formulation.
However, this time the number of optimization variables
will change since the power electronic converters will have
different set points for each of the possible system outages.
Therefore, (1) is not anymore a vector but a matrix given as:
u(N+1)(gn+cn 1) =
0BBBBBBBB@
Pg;1    Pg;N+1
Qg;1    Qg;N+1
Vg;1    Vg;N+1
Pc;1    Pc;N+1
Qc;1    Qc;N+1
Vc;1    Vc;N+1




However, since in the corrective SCOPF only the power
electronic converters set points can change, it follows that:8<: Pg;1 =    = Pg;N+1Qg;1 =    = Qg;N+1
Vg;1 =    = Vg;N+1
(7)
which means the ac generators set points must remain the
same for all the possible N+1 scenarios, i.e. the N outages
possibilities plus the normal operation condition.
When performing corrective SCOPF, it is commonly as-
sumed that as power electronic converters react faster, the
reaction of the ac generators can be neglected [13, 19, 21].
However, to include generators variables, e.g. Automatic Volt-
age Regulator (AVR) controllers, all that is need is to include
these variables in the set of optimization variables for the
corrective SCOPF algorihtm.
As it was the case with the preventive SCOPF formulation,
there will be N+1 power-flow results and the object function
is the same as the one shown in (5).
III. CASE STUDIES
The proposed ac-dc SCOPF algorithm was tested in two
distinct power systems: firstly, on an ac network with 9
nodes (based on MATPOWER data [27]) combined with a dc
network with 3 nodes and, later, on the IEEE 30 bus network
combined with a 5 node dc network. The layout of the first
ac-dc system is shown in Figure 3, whereas the layout of the
second ac-dc system is shown in Figure 4.
For both the ac networks, the data and operational limits are
taken as given in MATPOWER [27]. For both dc networks, the
direct voltage was chosen equal  200 kV, all ac-dc converters
are rated equally at 100 MVA, the dc cables resistance is taken
as 0.151 
/km (the cables lengths are given in Figure 3 and
Figure 4) and the direct voltage normal operational range is
assumed from 0.95 to 1.05 pu.
For the power flow in the ac and dc grids the trans-
mission lines are modelled as a single pi-section and loads
are considered of constant power. The ac-dc converters are
considered lossless, but the losses on the dc grid are taken
into consideration.
In both case studies, the following outages are considered:
1) contingencies on ac lines (xaci;j);
2) contingencies on dc lines (xdci;j);
3) contingencies ac generators (xgi;j) and;
4) contingencies on ac-dc converters (xci;j).
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Fig. 3. Combined ac-dc network with 9 ac and 3 dc buses (9AC+3DC
network).
Fig. 4. Combined ac-dc network with 30 ac and 5 dc buses (30AC+5DC
network).
Moreover, the SCOPF algorithm is constrained by the
following network operational limits (inequality constraints):
1) maximum loadings on ac and dc lines;
2) minimum and maximum voltages on ac and dc buses and;
3) minimum and maximum power ratings of all ac genera-
tors and ac-dc converters.
As mentioned in (5), wherever a network operational limit is
violated for a specified contingency scenario j, then the value
of j is altered to reflect the total number of violations in that
network condition.
For the smaller system, there are 18 possible N-1 contin-
gency scenarios – 9 ac lines, 3 dc lines, 3 ac generators and 3
ac-dc converters – whereas for the larger system there are 58
possible N-1 contingency scenarios – 41 ac lines, 6 dc lines,
6 ac generators and 5 ac-dc converters.
In both systems the ac generators and the ac-dc converters
are controlling their active power and their nodal voltage. The
exceptions are both generators 1, which are taken as the slack
nodes in their respective ac networks and, therefore, can only
control their nodal voltage; and both ac-dc converters 1, which
are taken as the slack nodes for their respective dc network
and, hence, control their direct voltage.
Therefore, according to (2) there will be 11 control variables
in the smaller network and 21 in the larger network when the
normal OPF or the preventive SCOPF are performed. Although
the larger network has thrice the number of nodes than the
smaller network, the optimization variables are barely doubled,
as only control variables are optimized. Instead, if a corrective
SCOPF is performed, the number of variables become 209 for
the smaller network (due to the 18 possible N-1 contingency
scenarios), and 1239 for the larger network (due to the possible
58 N-1 contingency scenarios).
Based on the aforementioned data for the smaller network,




xac1;1 = 0    xac1;18 = 1 xac1;19 = 1
           
xac9;1 = 1    xac9;18 = 1 xac9;19 = 1
xdc1;1 = 1    xdc1;18 = 1 xdc1;19 = 1
xdc2;1 = 1    xdc2;18 = 1 xdc2;19 = 1
xdc3;1 = 1    xdc3;18 = 1 xdc3;19 = 1
xg1;1 = 1    xg1;18 = 1 xg1;19 = 1
xg2;1 = 1    xg2;18 = 1 xg2;19 = 1
xg3;1 = 1    xg3;18 = 1 xg3;19 = 1
xc1;1 = 1    xc1;18 = 1 xc1;19 = 1
xc2;1 = 1    xc2;18 = 1 xc2;19 = 1
xc3;1 = 1    xc3;18 = 0 xc3;19 = 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(8)
whereas the u matrix can be written as:
u1911 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
Pg2;1    Pg2;19
Pg3;1    Pg3;19
Vg1;1    Vg1;19
Vg2;1    Vg2;19
Vg3;1    Vg3;19
Pc2;1    Pg2;19
Pc3;1    Pg3;19
Vc1;1    Vc1;19
Vc2;1    Vc2;19
Vc3;1    Vc3;19




In case of a regular OPF, just the last column of (8) and the
first column of (9) are needed, whereas in case of a preventive
SCOPF the whole x matrix and the first column of (9) are
needed. The same reasoning can be applied to the larger power
system to obtain its x and u matrices.
Table I shows the optimization variables and contingencies
scenarios for the different study cases.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, SPECIAL ISSUE ON POWER GRID RESILIENCE 5
TABLE I
CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS AND CONTROL VARIABLES IN THE DIFFERENT
CASE STUDIES.
Network 9AC+3DC 30AC+5DC
N-1 scenarios 18 58
Control variables OPF or preventive SCOPF 11 21
Control variables corrective SCOPF 209 1239
IV. RESULTS
To solve the power flows for the ac and the dc networks
in the presented methodology, the MATPOWER package was
used. Instead, to solve the optimization problem, the NOMAD
algorithm (Nonlinear Optimization using the MADS Algo-
rithm) was employed. NOMAD is released under the GNU
lesser general public license (LGPL) and is available as a
solver in the OPTI Toolbox suite for MATLAB, which is a
collection of compiled C-MEX functions to solve optimization
problems.
Table II displays the cost of operation for the different
security operation modes proposed: normal OPF, preventive
SCOPF and corrective SCOPF. It also provides a comparison
in case the dc network was not in operation.
TABLE II
COST OF OPERATION FOR THE DIFFERENT SECURITY OPERATION MODES.
9AC+3DC Network





Normal OPF 5,244.37 100.00 % 23
Preventive SCOPF 5,266.32 100.42 % 0
Corrective SCOPF 5,246.65 100.04 % 0
Without DC Network 5,296.69 101.00 % -
30AC+5DC Network
Normal OPF 573.01 100.00 % 10
Preventive SCOPF 573.91 100.16 % 4
Corrective SCOPF 573.67 100.12 % 3
Without DC Network 576.89 100.68 % -
A. 9AC+3DC Network
For the smaller network (9AC+3DC), the cost of operation
is 5,296.69 $/hr in case the dc network is not in operation and
5,244.37 $/hr in case the dc network is in operation and the
combined power system is operated in the normal OPF mode.
The difference between these two scenarios amounts to 1% of
the total operational costs, which would represent yearly circa
460 k$ in savings if the different stayed constant throughout
the year.
In case a preventive or corrective SCOPF are performed,
the cost of security is calculated as the difference between
the operation cost with and without the added N-1 security.
When the network is operated with a normal OPF, there can
be 23 different violations to operational constraints in case of
contingencies. Instead, when the 9AC+3DC network is oper-
ated with a preventive or corrective SCOPF no violations to
operational constraints have been found for all the possible 18
N-1 contingencies. However, the network operation becomes
slightly more expensive: the extra cost of security is 0.42% for
the preventive SCOPF operation and 0.04% for the corrective
SCOPF operation.
Figure 5 shows the bus voltages, the generator loadings and
the line loadings for the normal OPF, preventive SCOPF and
corrective SCOPF operation for the 9AC+3DC network. The
results are shown as N+1 bars, one for each of the N possible
contingency scenarios and the last one for when the network
is in its normal operation state.
If the network would be operated with a normal OPF,
in some of the N-1 contingency scenarios there would be
maximum voltage violations in buses 1, 3, 4, 6 and 8 (see
Figure 5 (a)). Regarding the line loadings, lines 10 and 11
(which are the first and second dc lines) would get very
close to their operational limits, however without violation
(99.9% loading), when there would be a fault on line 11
and 10, respectively (see Figure 5 (d)). Concerning the ac
generators and ac-dc power converters, the loading of VSC1
(“generator” 4) would become violated in most of the N-1
contingency scenarios. This is probably due to the fact that
VSC1 is the converter controlling the direct voltage in the dc
network, therefore, after a fault, if no other control action is
taken, this converter has to absorb any power imbalances to
make sure the dc network remains stable.
If the AC9+3DC network would be operated in a preventive
SCOPF mode, Figures 5 (b), (e) and (h) show that there
would be no violation of operational network limits in case
of single contingencies. However, as aforementioned, the cost
of operation would be the highest amongst the three analyzed
possibilities and, Figure 5 (b) shows that the preventive
SCOPF operation mode leads to a lower bus voltage profile
in this network, which translate into higher losses. In fact, the
total ac and dc losses for the preventive SCOPF operation are
1.916 MW, in comparison with 1.173 MW for the normal OPF
and 1.270 MW for the preventive SCOPF operation.
Figures 5 (c), (f) and (i) display the network bus voltages,
the line loadings and the generators and power converter load-
ings for the corrective SCOPF operation. As it was the case
with the preventive SCOPF operation, there are no operational
limit violations for all possible N-1 contingency scenarios.
Additionally, the corrective SCOPF mode has a lower oper-
ational cost than the preventive SCOPF mode. However, to
accomplish this lower operational cost while maintaining the
network security, this mode of operation leads to an increased
complexity as different operational set points must be sent to
the power converters for each of the possible N-1 contingency
scenarios. Therefore, it is important to evaluate whether the
increase control complexity does not significantly reduce, or
offset, the possible gains obtained with the optimization of the
unit commitment.
B. 30AC+5DC Network
The ac-dc hybrid network in this study case is based on the
IEEE 30-bus test system, which is modelled after the electric
power system in the Midwest of the USA in 1961.
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Fig. 5. Bus voltages, the generator loadings and the line loadings for the normal OPF, preventive SCOPF and corrective SCOPF operation for the 9AC+3DC
network.
Although the 30AC+5DC network has double the num-
ber of generators than the smaller 9AC+3DC network, the
operational costs are much lower in the case of the former
(see Table II). This is because the ac generators second order
polynomial model coefficients are lower in the larger network
(circa 5 times lower for the quadratic coefficient) and this
network has also less load: whereas the 9AC+3DC network
has a load of 315 MW, the load in the 30AC+5DC network
is only 189.2 MW.
Indeed, in comparison with the normal OPF operation for
this network, the cost of security in case of preventive or
corrective SCOPF operation is of only 0.16% and 0.12%,
respectively; whereas the operational cost without the dc
network would be 0.68% higher. This shows that in both power
systems the embedded dc network brings an advantage from
the operational costs perspective but also from an operational
security point of view.
Figure 6 shows the bus voltages, the generator loadings
and the line loadings for the normal OPF, preventive SCOPF
and corrective SCOPF operation for the 30AC+5DC network.
For the normal OPF operation, there were a total of only 10
possible network violations – 4 maximum voltage, 4 maximum
line loading and 2 maximum generator loading violations – for
the 58 possible N-1 contingency scenarios, which is probably
due to the fact that this network is not heavily loaded (the total
generation capacity is equal to 335 MW, but the total load is
189.2 MW).
Figure 6 (a) shows that the four voltage limit violations
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Fig. 6. Bus voltages, the generator loadings and the line loadings for the normal OPF, preventive SCOPF and corrective SCOPF operation for the 30AC+5DC
network.
happened in buses 5, 25 (twice) and 29 for faults in ac lines 8
(bus 5), ac lines 33 and 34 (bus 25), and ac line 39 (bus 29).
All buses have a limit of 1.05 pu, with the exception of the
ac generators buses (1, 2, 3, 13, 23 and 27) where the limit
is 1.10 pu, Therefore, Figure 6 (b) and (c) show that both
the preventive SCOPF and the corrective SCOPF operation
successfully managed to reduce the voltage limit violations to
zero in case of N-1 contingencies.
Regarding the four line loading violations for the normal
OPF operation, these happened on ac lines 22, when there
is a fault on ac line 25; ac lines 33 and 35, when there
is a fault on line 36; and ac line 10 when there is a fault
on the ac-dc converter 4. The preventive SCOPF algorithm
managed to eliminate the line loading violations on ac lines
33 and 35, whereas the corrective SCOPF algorithm – since
it can alter the power electronic converter set points – also
managed to eliminate the violation on ac line 10 when the ac-
dc converter 4 has a fault. However, both the preventive and
the corrective SCOPF algorithms did not manage to eliminate
the line loading violation on ac line 22 due to a fault on ac line
25, tough that violation is not of concern since it is of only
2.1%. It is worth noting that ac line 22 is amongst the weakest
lines in this network with a power rating of only 16 MW and,
therefore, a 2.1% violation represents only 0.336 MW.
Finally, Figure 6 (g), (h) and (i) show that there are two
violation to the loadings of generators 1 and 2 which could
not be meliorated either by the preventive or the corrective
SCOPF. The loading limit violation of generator 1 happens
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exactly when the generator 2 has a fault and, viceversa, the
one on generator 2 happens instead when the generator 1
has a fault. This is due to the fact that both generators are
connected to each other via a strong ac line (ac line 1 has
a maximum rating of 130 MW) and that both generators are
functioning as slack nodes of the ac network when the other
generator has a fault. Therefore, as mentioned in (1), as these
generators are working as slack nodes when the other has a
fault, the optimization preventive SCOPF and the corrective
SCOPF algorithms cannot control their active power in that
specific contingency scenario.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a new methodology for studying
the security-constrained optimal power flow operation of dc
networks to support ac networks under contingencies. The
obtained results have shown that the power system outage
management system works well both in case of the preventive
or corrective SCOPF algorithms. For both the analyzed power
systems, one with 12 buses (9AC+3DC) and another with
35 buses (30AC+5DC), the corrective SCOPF operation was
the one which provided the most security with the lower
operational costs. In the first network, where the total network
violations were reduced from 23 to none, the extra security
costs due to the corrective SCOPF operation was only 0.04%
versus 0.12% for the second network, where the violations
were reduced from 10 to 3. However, it is important to assess if
the higher control complexity in case of the corrective SCOPF
operation does overcomes the possible gains obtained with the
reduction of the power system operational costs. In that case,
a preventive SCOPF operation is the better solution because
it improves the security of supply and the power system
resilience to outages albeit with higher operational costs than
the corrective SCOPF operation. Future work will concentrate
on using the binary outage matrix, which is the strongest point
of the proposed methodology, combined with a mixed-integer
non-linear optimization algorithm to study how the dc network
can provide support to the ac network in case of a partial or
complete power system restoration.
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